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Poor quality care in public sector hospitals coupled with the costs of care in the
private sector have trapped India’s poor in a vicious cycle of poverty, ill health
and debt for many decades. To address this, the governments of Andhra Pradesh
(AP) and Maharashtra (MH), India, have attempted to improve people’s access
to hospital care by partnering with the private sector. A number of government-
sponsored schemes with differing specifications have been launched to facilitate
this strategy.
Aims This article aims to compare changes in access to, and affordability and
efficiency of private and public hospital inpatient (IP) treatments between MH
and AP from 2004 to 2012 and to assess whether the health financing
innovations in one state resulted in larger or smaller benefits compared with the
other.
Methods We used data from household surveys conducted in 2004 and 2012 in the two
states and undertook a difference-in-difference (DID) analysis. The results focus
on hospitalization, out-of-pocket expenditure and length of stay.
Results The average IP expenditure for private hospital care has increased in both states,
but more so in MH. There was also an observable increase in both utilization of
and expenditure on nephrology treatment in private hospitals in AP. The
duration of stay recorded in days for private hospitals has increased slightly in
MH and declined in AP with a significant DID. The utilization of public hospitals
has reduced in AP and increased in MH.
Conclusion The state of AP appears to have benefited more than MH in terms of improved
access to care by involving the private sector. The Aarogyasri scheme is likely to
have contributed to these impacts in AP at least in part. Our study needs to be
followed up with repeated evaluations to ascertain the long-term impacts of
involving the private sector in providing hospital care.
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KEY MESSAGES
 The findings of the study highlight the fact that participation of private sector in the Rajiv Aarogyasri scheme in Andhra
Pradesh has improved the access to health care in the state.
 Despite the improvement in access to healthcare there is no evidence to support the fact that a huge volume of patients
have been driven to seek healthcare in private hospitals especially among the unreached rural population.
 It has to a certain extent mitigated the cost of healthcare in the state especially when compared to the control state in the
study.
Introduction
We stand at a moment of exceptional possibility. A moment when
global health and development goals that long seemed unattainable
have moved within our reach.
World Bank Group President Jim Yong Kim’s Speech at
World Health Assembly made on 21 May 2013
The Indian healthcare system has witnessed many changes in
the last decade. There has been an improvement in the health
indices such as infant mortality, maternal mortality and life
expectancy (CESS 2012). Though India is some distance away
from achieving some of its Millennium Development Goals
(MDG targets), much progress has been made towards these
goals. There has been a slew of reforms in the health sector
beginning with the launch of the National Rural Health
Mission in 2005 with an aim to ‘improve the availability of
and access to quality health care by people, especially for those
residing in rural areas, the poor, women and children’ (NRHM
2005).
Despite these efforts, there is a huge cross section of the
population that continues to struggle to gain access to afford-
able good quality healthcare. Although the rich can access
healthcare by paying large sums of money, the poor are under
major threat of financial duress, sometimes following a single
episode of illness that may push even the middle income groups
into poverty or indebtedness (Rao et al. 2011). Although the
government-funded facilities struggle to provide services to the
vast and growing population, the exponential growth of private
facilities has been highly unregulated and unchecked.
Meanwhile, low levels of public health financing, supply side
gaps, an acute shortage of human resources and the rising cost
of healthcare continue to severely affect access, affordability
and quality of health services across the country.
Against this background, the government has been attempt-
ing to address two main challenges: to ensure that all citizens
can access healthcare equitably and to ensure that healthcare is
made available at an affordable cost and without compromising
on quality.
To achieve this, there have been attempts to facilitate access
to the state-of-the-art private hospitals for the benefit of the
‘unreached and underprivileged’. During the past two decades,
central and state governments have designed a number of
different state-funded insurance schemes aimed at increasing
access to healthcare and making hospitalization affordable for
the poor. One of the first new generation schemes to be
launched was the Rajiv Aarogyasri Scheme (RAS) developed
and funded by the Government of Andhra Pradesh (AP) in
2007 (Fan et al. 2012). The scheme provides free access to over
900 secondary and tertiary procedures and covers more than
75% of the population (RAS 2012). The Rashtriya Swasthya
Bima Yojana (RSBY) was another scheme that was launched
nationally in 2008 (RSBY 2013a). This scheme is jointly funded
by the central and state governments. In Maharashtra (MH)
enrolment to RSBY began in mid-2009, whereas in AP
enrolment began in 2013 and has only occurred in one district
(RSBY 2013b). Both the schemes ‘empanel’ private and public
hospitals to provide treatments funded by them.
Role of the private health sector in
India
In the early 1950s, after the independence of India, the private
sector constituted only 8% of the market (Venkat Raman 2008).
By contrast, according to the National Health Accounts 2009, the
share of private expenditure was 73% of the total health
expenditure (Planning Commission of India 2013). In six and a
half decades, the private sector share has grown nine times and
the public sector has declined in absolute terms by a third. The
Indian healthcare market was expected to grow by an estimated
Unites States Dollar (USD) 40 billion by 2012 (PwC 2007) while
the private health sector market (in terms of the amount spent on
healthcare as a private industry) was valued at around USD 29
billion in 2009 (PwC 2007). Meanwhile, public expenditure on
health has hovered at around 1% of gross domestic product
(GDP). The private health sector contributes around 70% of all the
hospitals and 40% of total hospital beds (PwC 2007). In RSBY,
70% of the hospitals enrolled are private (La Forgia and Nagpal
2012), and in the RAS private hospitals make up around 78% of
the providers (RAS 2012). According to a study of government-
sponsored health insurance schemes in India (Singh and
Kalvakuntla 2013), the introduction of RAS in 2007 resulted in
a substantial increase in utilization of both public and private
facilities, but as the scheme grew, the utilization of private
facilities kept increasing while that of public facilities stabilized.
According to the Department of Medical Education in AP, there
has been a steady increase in the number of private hospitals
gaining formal ‘recognition’ as teaching hospitals after the
introduction of RAS, as illustrated in Figure 1.
The evidence illustrates that the private health sector has a
key role to play in delivering health services in AP and that its
role is likely to remain important in the future. Consequently, it
is important to understand how the private sector facilities
contribute to health care access, affordability and quality
(Mallipeddi et al. 2009).
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In AP following the launch of the RAS, there have also been
attempts to strengthen public hospitals, which were in a state
of neglect, leaving the poor no option but to access costly
private facilities (Nagulapalli and Rokkam 2013). The govern-
ment has been providing financial incentives to the surgical
teams of public hospitals for every treatment provided under
the umbrella of the RAS (Niloufer Hospital 2014). In parallel,
the participation of private healthcare providers was intended
to encourage the public sector to match the quality of their
services by inducing competition. Furthermore, the government
of AP and the Aarogyasri Healthcare Trust (the organization
which commissions the RAS) have encouraged private–public
partnerships to improve care. For example, they have supported
the development of technologically advanced dialysis units
in public hospitals in partnership with a private company
(B. Braun) to address the high unmet needs of patients with
renal disease (B. Braun 2013).
Aims of the study
Against this background, this article aims to assess changes
in accessibility, affordability and perceptions of efficiency
of private health care inpatient (IP) treatment across the
states of MH and AP from 2004–05 to 2012. In our study,
we compared two states with relatively similar economic and
demographic conditions (Table 1).
Methodology
We used a retrospective, longitudinal, controlled quasi-
experimental study to compare IP health care-related expend-
itures and behaviours (HREB) in AP (the state implementing
RAS) and in MH, the state implementing RSBY (Angrist and
Pischke 2009). HREBs were measured in both AP and MH by
two waves of household surveys before (2004) and after (2012)
the introduction of RAS and RSBY.
Baseline data
We used unit-level data from the National Sample Survey
Organization (NSSO) 60th round survey, conducted in 2004.
This decennial survey was the most recent round measuring
population morbidity profiles, use of health care services
including hospitalized and non-hospitalized treatments and
expenditures incurred (NSSO 2004). The household survey
used a multi-stage stratified sampling methodology (NSSO
2004), to identify a representative random population sample
and an interviewer completed a questionnaire to obtain
measures of HREB along with sociodemographic, household
expenditure and other information (See Supplementary infor-
mation, Annex 1).
Follow-up survey: 2012
We used the same household survey design and methods to
collect post-intervention data in AP and MH as those used by
Table 1 Urban and rural populations and households surveyed in 2004 and 2012 in AP and MHa
AP MH
2004 2012 2004 2012
Population in the entire state 76 210 007b 84 665 533c 96 878 627b 112 372 972c
Urban population in the state 20 808 940b 28 353 745c 41 100 980b 50 827 531c
Rural population in the state 55 401 067b 56 311 788c 55 777 647b 61 545 441c
Total households in the state (urban) 4 397 138b 6 778 225c 8 403 224b 10 813 928c
Total households in the state (rural) 12 607 167b 14 246 309c 11 173 512b 13 016 652c
Total households in the state 17 004 305b 21 024 534c 19 576 736b 23 830 580c
FSUs surveyed (urban) 183d 372e 267d 504e
FSUs surveyed (rural) 325d 491e 265d 504e
Total households surveyed (urban) 1824d 3715e 2664d 5038e
Total households surveyed (rural) 3235d 4908e 2650d 5035e
aFSU, first-stage unit.
b2001 census.
c2011 census.
dNSSO 2004.
eThe NSSO 66th round had 492 rural FSUs in AP, but 1 FSU was found to be uninhabited. The list of FSUs which were surveyed in the 66th
round were obtained from the Coordination and Publication Division of the National Survey Sample Organization after the investigators
requested deputy director general to instruct their regional offices to provide these.
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Figure 1 The number of private hospitals receiving recognition as
teaching hospitals per year by the Department of Medical Education in
AP (APDME 2012).
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NSSO. Briefly, the household survey used a multi-stage
stratified sampling methodology with the ‘first-stage units’
(FSUs) identical to those used by NSSO in their 66th round
(2008–09), the latest round for which FSUs had been mapped.
However, the FSUs were not the same as those in NSSO 2004,
our baseline survey, rapid urbanization having changed sub-
stantially the urban–rural landscape of both states and thus the
geographical basis for sampling units.
Analysis
The key to infer causality to a particular intervention lies in
identifying the confounders and assessing the trends in the
behaviour of the control and the treatment group (Angrist and
Pischke 2009). But, in the absence of multidimensional or panel
data our best approach for this study was to use baseline
(2004) and endline (2012 our study) data for these two states
and analyse the data using a difference-in-difference (DID)
methodology.
The DID of outcome (YDDÞ is
ðYAP2012  YAP2004Þ  ðYMH2012  YMH2004Þ
where the scripts for Y refer to the respective states and the
years when the surveys were done. Confidence intervals were
calculated from the standard error YDD and the P value for the
null-hypothesis (YDD ¼ 0) was tested using the Wald test as
t ¼ YDDSEYDD with one degree of freedom. YDD was estimated using
ordinary least-square regression
yit ¼ 0 þ 1statei þ 2surveyt þ 3ðstate  surveyÞit
þ
Xm
k¼1
3þkcovariatek þ "
where yit is the outcome, state is a dummy variable with 0 for
MH and 1 for AP and survey is a dummy variable with 0 for the
2004 survey and 1 for the 2012 survey. The coefficient for the
interaction term, 3, gives the DID estimate, YDD, while "i is an
idiosyncratic error term. Robust standard errors of YDD were
calculated to account for design effect due to clustering of
households within FSUs using Stata survey commands. A
positive value for YDD suggested that the change in the outcome
in AP was more than the change in MH and a negative value
would suggest the reverse. NSSO provided weights along with
the unit-level data for the 2004 data, and we developed weights
using the same method for our survey.
The basic DID results were obtained using the above
regression with covariates excluded. The adjusted DID results
are obtained using the above regression with m¼ 9 covariates,
namely the gender of head of household, a dummy variable
capturing whether the household lives in a rural or urban
location, three dummy variables capturing the household’s
social group (the lowest is the excluded category), and four
asset quintile dummies (the bottom is the excluded category).
This regression simply compares the change between 2004 and
2012 between the two states: the coefficient 1 gives the extra
growth in y in AP over and above that in MH. If Aarogyasri and
other initiatives implemented between 2004 and 2012 in AP
had the same effect on y as those initiatives implemented
between 2004 and 2012 in MH, 1 will be zero. The 3 will
reduce any bias in our estimate due to a correlation between
the 3 and the AP dummy, and will also give us greater
precision in our estimate of 0 (Angrist and Pischke 2009).
Variables of interest
Access to IP care
Hospitalization rate: This was estimated as the numbers of
individuals hospitalized during the previous year per 1000
population. In addition, among those hospitalized, the utiliza-
tion of public and private hospitals overall and for cardiac and
nephrology has been analysed using DID. These values are a
proportion of those being hospitalized.
Cost
Expenditure on hospitalization: the average out-of-pocket
expenditure (OOPE) for IP care per individual within 1
year of the survey was estimated for the population from
questionnaire responses for AP and MH from both baseline and
endline data.
Expenditure on ‘high-cost’ treatments: the average OOPE for
IP care within 1 year of the survey was estimated for both
public and private hospitals per episode of cardiac and
nephrology treatments, which were used as proxies for high-
cost treatments. These procedures are some of the most
expensive and they also require long-term follow-up
treatments.
Efficiency
The duration of hospital stay has been used as a proxy for
efficiency. This variable is self-reported and measured in
number of days of stay in the hospital. Data have been
analysed by rural and urban residence.
Results
For the various variables of interest and the sub groups, the
results are shown as the averages in the baseline, the change in
the 2012 survey when compared with the baseline, with the
DID estimate with 95% confidence interval and the respective P
values of the DID comparing AP with MH.
Access to IP care
Table 2 shows the proportion of IP cases in various subgroups
among those hospitalized. In general, utilization of private
hospitals has increased in AP and decreased in MH. The
likelihood of admission to a private hospital was significant for
hospitalizations among urban households (P¼ 0.0002) and in
particular for nephrology treatment among urban households
(P¼ 0.0007).
The pattern of utilization of public hospitals was different.
The overall utilization of public facilities has reduced in both
the states and more so in AP (P¼ 0.087). There was an increase
in utilization of public facilities in MH and a reduction in AP
for urban households (P¼ 0.002) and cardiac hospitalizations in
rural households (P-value 0.089). An opposite trend was
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observed for nephrology care among rural households
(P¼ 0.028).
Changes in average IP expenditure—public vs
private
Table 3 shows averages of IP expenditure among those
hospitalized in private and public healthcare facilities in 2004
and 2012. The table also shows the real terms change (deflated
to 2004 prices) in these outcomes at follow-up and the DID
estimate comparing AP with MH.
The overall expenditure on IP care per episode in private
facilities has increased in both states (more so in MH, P¼ 0.04).
Expenditures on high-cost treatments such as cardiac care and
nephrology show a mixed picture. The expenditure on neph-
rology hospitalizations in private facilities has increased in
urban households (P¼ 0.004). The average expenditure on
public facilities has also increased in both states and more
again in MH (P¼ 0002). A similar trend is observed in rural
and urban households. The expenditure on cardiac care in
public hospitals has reduced in AP while it has increased in
MH. The expenditure on nephrology has increased in both
states but more so in AP.
Efficiency
There has been a minor increase in the average length of stay
(recorded in days) in private hospitals in MH while we found a
decrease of 33% in average length of stay in private hospitals in.
The results from the DID analysis gave an average reduction of 3.2
days in AP (P¼ 0.002) and among those in rural households
(P¼ 0.007). For public hospitals, it has decreased in both AP and
MH, and significantly more so, with an average of 4.2 days, in AP
for rural households (P¼ 0.09), as shown in Table 4.
Limitations
Despite the states being similar in their profiles, there may
have been factors resulting in unobserved changes between
the two populations. These factors may have driven the direction
Table 2 Change in proportion of IP cases in public and private hospitals (among those hospitalized)
IP cases Baseline mean (95% CI) Change 2004:2012 mean (95% CI) DID estimate
MH AP MH AP Mean (95% CI) P
P
ri
va
te
Overall 0.72 (0.7:0.73) 0.7 (0.69:0.72) 0.011 (0.053:0.031) 0.065 (0.018:0.11) 0.076 (0.012:0.14) 0.02
DID estimate with covariates
Mean (95% CI) P
0.05 (0.007:0.11) 0.03
Rural 0.72 (0.69:0.75) 0.73 (0.7:0.75) 0.030 (0.027:0.089) 0.028 (0.023:0.081) 0.0019 (0.080:0.076) 0.96
Urban 0.72 (0.70:0.75) 0.63 (0.6:0.66) 0.067 (0.13:0.0063) 0.14 (0.047:0.23) 0.21 (0.095:0.31) 0.0002
Cardiac 0.056 (0.037:0.076) 0.072 (0.038:0.1) 0.017 (.038:0.0038) 0.018 (0.05:0.015) 0.0015 (0.042:0.039) 0.94
Cardiac rural 0.037 (0.017:0.057) 0.06 (0.016:0.1) 0.0056 (0.028:0.016) 0.008 (0.055:0.037) 0.0031 (0.054:0.048) 0.9
Cardiac urban 0.08 (0.046:0.011) 0.097 (0.057:0.13) 0.028 (0.06:0.0085) 0.04 (0.083:0.002) 0.012 (0.069:0.043) 0.65
Nephrology 0.035 (0.047:0.09) 0.069 (0.047:0.09) 0.027 (0.051:0.004) 0.0023 (.012:0.021) 0.029 (0.0036:0.06) 0.053
Nephrology rural 0.052 (0.023:0.08) 0.042 (0.019:0.065) 0.009 (0.026:0.02) 0.006 (0.032:0.02) 0.0036 (0.037:0.04) 0.86
Nephrology urban 0.088 (0.055:0.12) 0.018 (0.005:0.031) 0.04 (0.084:0.014) 0.021 (0.0009:0.041) 0.07 (0.03:0.11) 0.0007
P
u
b
li
c
Overall 0.27 (0.23:0.31) 0.3 (0.26:0.34) 0.011 (0.032:0.053) 0.064 (0.11:0.017) 0.075 (0.14:0.0125) 0.019
DID estimate with covariates
Mean (95% CI) P
0.06 (0.11:0.005) 0.074
Rural 0.28 (0.21:0.35) 0.27 (0.23:0.31) 0.03 (0.09:0.028) 0.028 (0.08:0.02) 0.0019 (0.076:0.08) 0.96
Urban 0.26 (0.21:0.32) 0.36 (0.28:0.45) 0.067 (.062:0.12) 0.14 (0.23:0.047) 0.2 (0.31:0.095) 0.0002
Cardiac 0.0034 (0.02:0.049) 0.045 (0.025:0.065) 0.005 (0.015:0.025) 0.014 (0.038:0.11) 0.019 (0.05:0.013) 0.25
Cardiac rural 0.005 (0.00034:0.011) 0.042 (0.014:0.07) 0.014 (0.012:0.04) 0.021 (0.053:0.0098) 0.036 (0.076:0.00513) 0.089
Cardiac urban 0.053 (0.026:0.078) 0.05 (0.02:0.0786) 0.008 (0.04:0.024) 0.011 (0.031:0.054) 0.019 (0.034:0.072) 0.48
Nephrology 0.048 (0.024:0.070) 0.039 (0.0083:0.069) 0.026 (0.05:0.0016) 0.012 (0.046:0.02) 0.014 (0.028:0.055) 0.52
Nephrology rural 0.03 (0.012:0.049) 0.0078 (0.0017:0.0014) 0.014 (0.035:0.0076) 0.018 (0.0029:0.036) 0.031 (0.0034:0.059) 0.028
Nephrology urban 0.069 (0.023:0.11) 0.083 (0.011:0.16) 0.043 (0.09:0.0042) 0.055 (0.13:0.019) 0.012 (0.1:0.077) 0.79
CI, confidence intervals.
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of the DID. The DID analysis itself assumes that there has been
not much time variance in the subjects under study which is not
true (Angrist and Pischke 2009). The 2004 NSSO survey which
served as our baseline survey was conducted between January
and June 2004 (NSSO 2004). Our 2012 survey was carried out
over a period of 3 months from June to September. The morbidity
and mortality patterns recorded in different time periods may
vary and could have influenced the data.
Discussion and policy implications
The utilization of private facilities in AP shows significant
difference in facilities for certain treatments; this could be
explained by the presence of the Aarogyasri scheme which
provides access to private facilities. In the earlier sections, it
has also been highlighted that there was an increase in
recognition of private teaching hospitals after the launch of the
RAS; this could have further influenced the utilization of
private hospitals. The scheme not only provides financial
protection, it also gives the beneficiaries more choice of providers
including private hospitals for specified conditions. Because
the Aarogyasri beneficiaries are entitled to additional funding
for nephrology treatments the utilization may have increased
in the state. Even though the findings are in general skewed
in favour of utilization of private hospitals, the increased
utilization of public hospitals among rural households for
nephrology treatments may reflect greater use of state-of-the-
art dialysis units developed in public hospitals by the public–
private partnership between B. Braun, Government of AP and the
Aarogyasri Healthcare Trust as mentioned earlier. The rural
patients may have travelled to the nearest public hospitals
with dialysis facilities, these being distributed across several cities
of AP (B.Braun 2013). These findings suggest that
the participation of private health care providers in partnership
with government may have resulted in improved access
to healthcare. Our findings may suggest that the positive effects
of Aarogyasri detected by other studies at an early stage of the
roll-out of the scheme have been sustained. Automatic enrolment
into the scheme, near universality of coverage and no require-
ment for enrollee contributions may have contributed further to
the significant DIDs (Fan et al. 2012).
Unlike nephrology, the utilization of cardiac care has decreased
in both public and private hospitals in AP. This is consistent with
the utilization patterns of the scheme itself. When Aarogyasri was
launched in 2007, 52% of the surgeries carried out were for
cardiology and cardiothoracic surgeries (RAS 2013). However
these figures declined to 25% in 2008, 16% in 2009, 14% in 2010
and 12% in 2011, 2012 and 2013. This trend may indicate that as
the scheme was being rolled out there was a huge unmet need for
cardiac surgery, which was addressed by the Aarogyasri scheme
in its post-launch phase.
Another possible explanation for comparatively greater
utilization of private facilities in AP than in MH is that only
2 million households were enrolled under RSBY (RSBY 2013a)
in MH by the time of the survey, while in AP more than 70
million (RAS 2012) families were enrolled under RAS, i.e. more
than 80% of the population of AP. Studies have also reported
that the utilization of RSBY has been low in MH (Thakur and
Ghosh 2013) especially when compared with the other states in
which it has been launched (Palacios et al. 2011). The ‘Critical
Assessment of the Existing Health Insurance Models in India’
by Reddy et al. (2011) has highlighted that while only 12% of
MH’s population is covered by health insurance, in AP the
coverage is as high as 87% (near universal). An assessment of a
community-based health insurance scheme in the neighbouring
state of Karnataka also demonstrated an increased utilization of
private facilities for surgeries (Agarwal 2010). Furthermore, a
descriptive study of the Aarogyasri scheme in its early years
highlighted that, given a choice, the poor prefer clean hospitals
with polite staff, predominantly available in the private sector
Table 4 The duration of hospital stay in days
IP cases Baseline mean (95% CI) Change 2004:2012
mean (95% CI)
DID estimate
MH AP MH AP Mean (95% CI) P
P
ri
va
te
Overall 6.6 (6.1:7.2) 10 (8.1:11.8) 0.18 (0.46:0.81) 3 (4.9:1.2) 3.2 (5.3:1.2) 0.002
DID estimate with covariates
Mean (95% CI) P
3.2 (5.4:1.2) 0.003
Rural 6.9 (6.2:7.7) 10.5 (8.1:12.9) 0.1 (1:0.79) 3.8 (2.9:0.96) 3.7 (6.3:1) 0.007
Urban 6.2 (5.4:7) 8.9 (6.5:11.2) 0.5 (4:1.4) 1.3 (3.7:1.2) 1.8 (4.4:0.8) 0.17
P
u
b
li
c
Overall 9.7 (7.4:11.9) 11.5 (10.1:12.9) 2.5 (4.9:0.05) 4.5 (6.3:2.6) 2 (5.1:1.1) 0.2
DID estimate with covariates
Mean (95% CI) P
2 (5.0:1.1) 0.2
Rural 10.1 (6.4:14) 13.3 (11.2:15.3) 1.9 (6:2.1) 6 (8.7:3.5) 4.2 (9:0.6) 0.09
Urban 9.3 (7.5:11) 8.9 (7.7:10) 3 (4.9:0.9) 2 (3.8:0.5) 0.7 (1.8:3.2) 0.59
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(Rao et al. 2011). A notable observation is that admissions
to private hospitals among rural households have increased
in both MH and AP. This may be a result of an increase in
private hospitals in smaller towns which are in the vicinity of
the rural areas and also the availability of better ambulance
facilities.
With increase in utilization, average OOPE has also increased in
both public and private facilities for both the states, but more so in
MH. The expenditure on cardiac care in private hospitals has
reduced in AP in both rural and urban areas, and increased in MH,
although the DID is not significant. The expenditure on cardiac
care in public hospitals has reduced in AP while it has increased in
MH and that on nephrology has increased in both states but more
so in AP, even though none of these results are statistically
significant. The explanation may be that, although the scheme
covers not only the treatment but also additional costs such as for
food and transport, patients needing nephrology treatments
which require frequent hospitalization, and their families una-
ware of these benefits, may be bearing these additional costs.
Nephrology treatments also need long-term care and medication;
perhaps the patients are unaware of the fact that they are entitled
to 7 months of follow-up medicine in addition to the other
benefits. The expenditure on hospitalizations for cardiac care in
public hospitals has increased in MH and reduced in AP, despite
decreased utilization in both states.
In AP, there has been a reduction in average length of hospital
stay in comparison with MH. This change may be directly related
to the increased numbers of those seeking hospital care, and
shorter durations of admission in response to fixed treatment
costs reimbursed by the RAS. Given their entitlement to hospital
care under the RAS in AP, people may have begun seeking care at
an earlier stage and also for less serious complaints, because the
treatment is offered free of cost.
Conclusion
The findings of this study illustrate that providing a scheme
such as the Aarogyasri, which involves the private sector, not
only benefits those covered under the scheme but also
indirectly motivates the healthcare providers to establish
better facilities in even smaller towns, hence improving access
to hospital care for serious illness. The Aarogyasri scheme may
also be influencing greater efficiency of care in both public and
private hospitals. The fact that competition is encouraged
between public and private hospitals and public hospital staff
are incentivized to improve their services, may result in
improved morale and quality of care and services in public
hospitals as well as improved ethics and behaviours among the
private hospitals, mindful of the increasing competition from
the public sector hospitals. The Aarogyasri scheme has also
demonstrated an important additional benefit of public–private
partnerships; that public providers may be enabled to provide
technologically advanced treatments in state-of-the-art facilities
developed in their hospitals. This study assessed the impact of
private hospital participation in the Aarogyasri scheme, by
exploring changes in access to and household expenditure on IP
care. AP appears to have benefited more than MH in terms
of improving access to care over time. This positive change is
likely to be attributable to the RAS, which encourages the
involvement of the private sector in care provision, at least in
part.
Other states have replicated Aarogyasri and there are
opportunities to introduce changes that can improve care not
only in AP but also influence the programmes of other states. It
is now important to look closer at the quality of services to
make sure that the increase in use of services has not
compromised the quality. Additional studies such as facility
surveys and clinical audits (in addition to those carried out by
the government itself) need to be undertaken to compare the
quality of care provided by the private and public hospitals, and
to understand further, the long-term impact of private
participation in providing hospital care under the aegis of a
publicly funded health financing scheme.
Supplementary Data
Supplementary data are available at HEAPOL online.
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